Spread Trustee Company Ltd v Hutcheson by Shearman, Jennifer & Pearce, Robert
 181 
Denning Law Journal 2009 Vol 22 pp 181-191 
 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 
 
EXEMPTING A TRUSTEE FOR GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE 
 
Spread Trustee Company Ltd v Hutcheson 
Privy Council [2011] UKPC 13 
 
Jennifer Shearman* and Robert Pearce** 
 
Can an exemption clause exclude a trustee‟s liability for gross negligence? 
That was the question which the Privy Council was required to consider in 
this appeal from the Guernsey Courts. Guernsey has developed substantial 
activities in finance and trusts, and now has legislation (the Trusts (Guernsey) 
Law 2007) creating a legal framework for this business. The legislative 
framework was first introduced in 1989, and amended in 1990. The effect of 
an exemption clause had never been considered in litigation in Guernsey prior 
to the introduction of legislation. The Trusts (Guernsey) Law 1989 section 
34(7) provided: 
 
“Nothing in the terms of a trust shall relieve a trustee of liability for a 
breach of trust arising from his own fraud or wilful misconduct.” 
 
That provision was amended by the Trusts (Amendment) (Guernsey) Law 
1990 by adding “or gross negligence”. The 2007 Law contains a provision 
which is in substantially similar terms to the 1989 Law as amended. In Spread 
Trustee Co Ltd v Hutcheson
1
 the acts and omissions on the part of the trustees 
took place over a number of years. The relevant trust instruments contained an 
exclusion clause and the Privy Council had to decide whether or not it was 
effective to exclude liability for gross negligence in respect of the matters 
arising before the coming into force of the 1989 and 1990 Laws. The Board 
was unanimous in finding that the legislation did not operate retrospectively. 
However, the Board was divided over whether under the customary law of 
Guernsey it was not possible to exempt trustees from liability for gross 
negligence. The Privy Council concluded by a majority that the customary 
law of Guernsey would have followed English Law, and that the Guernsey 
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courts, if the question had arisen before 1989, would or should have come to 
the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal in Armitage v Nurse,
2
 which 
correctly states English law.  There was therefore nothing in Guernsey law, 
prior to legislative change, which prevented the exclusion of liability for gross 
negligence. 
 
THE ISSUES 
 
The claimants were beneficiaries under two settlements set up in 
November 1977 who alleged they were entitled to compensation of £53.5 
million, including interest, for losses arising from failures on the part of the 
defendant, a professional trustee company, and the previous trustees. The 
beneficiaries claimed that the defendant was grossly negligent in its 
investment policy and in failing to investigate breaches by the previous 
trustees. Each settlement contained an exclusion clause, exonerating the 
trustees from liability for losses to the trust fund except in the case of wilful 
and individual fraud and wrongdoing on the part of the trustee sought to be 
made liable. The defendant claimed this protected it from any liability for 
breach of trust resulting from its gross negligence. The question to be 
determined as a preliminary issue was whether Guernsey law prohibited the 
exclusion of liability for gross negligence for breaches of trust arising before 
February 19th 1991 (being the date the 1990 Amendment Law came into 
force) and if it did, whether the prohibition applied to breaches arising prior to 
April 22nd 1989 (being the date the 1989 Law came into force). 
 
ROYAL COURT OF GUERNSEY 
 
The case first came before the Lieutenant Bailiff Sir de Vic Carey. In his 
view, it had never been possible for a trustee to exclude liability for gross 
negligence under Guernsey Law. He believed that the provisions dealing with 
exclusion clauses in the 1989 Law, as amended in 1990, were declaratory of 
Guernsey law. The policy letter
3
 introducing the 1989 Law proposed 
legislation broadly on the lines of earlier legislation passed in Jersey, and the 
legislation actually introduced was similarly worded. That demonstrated that 
the enactment of Guernsey Trust Laws arose from a desire to keep in step 
with Jersey. The original Jersey law of 1984 did not refer to exclusion of 
liability for gross negligence, but was amended to cover this aspect of liability 
in 1989. The Jersey Court of Appeal in Midland Bank Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd v 
Federated Pension Servs
4
 had considered obiter that the aim of the legislature 
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in amending the 1984 Law was to clarify, rather than to change, the 
provisions, and that therefore the 1989 Jersey Amendment Law had effect in 
relation to breaches taking place between the two Laws. The Lieutenant 
Bailiff considered that, even though the Jersey decision had only persuasive 
force, the statement in s 18(1) of the 1989 Guernsey Law, which  provides 
that a trustee “shall, in the exercise of his functions, observe the utmost good 
faith and act en bon père de famille” was declaratory of the existing law, and 
the same was true of s 34(7) dealing with exclusion clauses. The amendment 
made in 1990 was only a minor change of emphasis. Acting with gross 
negligence in the discharge of one‟s duties as a trustee could not be 
compatible with acting en bon père de famille. He said:  “I further cannot see 
how any clause in a trust deed completed before 1989 which purported to 
discharge a trustee from liability to the trust for failures to act en bon père de 
famille could have been upheld by the court.”5  
 
COURT OF APPEAL (GUERNSEY) 
 
The Trustee appealed to the Guernsey Court of Appeal,
6
 and once again 
the preliminary issues were answered in favour of the claimant, but for 
different reasons. The Guernsey Court of Appeal said that the proper approach 
to construction of the two Laws was firstly to investigate the customary law of 
Guernsey before the enactment of the 1989 Law. The law of trusts in 
Guernsey comprised a mixture of English and customary principles and even 
though the rules had generally advanced further in England than in other 
jurisdictions, they would not be applied where they were inconsistent with 
Guernsey law. The court considered both Midland Bank Trust and Armitage v 
Nurse, pointing out that both cases had been decided after the 1989 Law had 
been introduced. In Midland Bank Trust the Jersey Court of Appeal had 
reviewed a series of mainly nineteenth and early twentieth century Scottish 
cases and concluded that they could all be regarded as decisions on the 
construction of the relevant exclusion clause, a conclusion with which Millet 
LJ in Armitage v Nurse agreed. The Guernsey Court of Appeal did not agree, 
and thought the cases laid down a clear rule of law that no exoneration clause 
could exclude liability for fraud or gross negligence. The Court pointed out 
that The Scottish Law Commission had come to same view, saying: 
 
“In our view… the Scottish law on immunity clauses remains as stated 
in the 19
th
 century cases. Gross negligence or gross breach of duty is 
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regarded as tantamount to dole or fraud and cannot be excused : culpa 
lata dolo aequiparatur.”7 
 
The Court noted that prior to to Armitage v Nurse, which held that it was 
permissible to exclude liability for gross negligence, English law was 
uncertain. The English Law Commission thought in 1992 that gross 
negligence might not be excluded, saying: 
 
“Beyond this, trustees and fiduciaries cannot exempt themselves from 
liability for fraud, bad faith and wilful default … It is also not 
altogether clear whether the prohibition on the exclusion of liability 
for „wilful default‟ also prohibits exclusion of liability for gross 
negligence although we incline to the view that it does.”8 
 
The Court concluded that the conclusion reached in Armitage v Nurse was 
inconsistent with Guernsey customary law. Millett LJ had rejected the 
suggestion that a duty to act without gross negligence was one of the core 
obligations of trustees, but his decision should not be applied. He had been 
mistaken in his view of the Scottish cases; his rejection of gross negligence as 
a civilian concept alien to the common law carried no weight in Guernsey, 
with its mixed English and Norman law ancestry;
9
 and the clear position in 
Scottish law would, in Guernsey, have been adopted in preference to the 
uncertainty in English law. The report
10
 put before the States (the legislature) 
highlighted the fact that the roots of Guernsey law lay in Norman customary 
law, and the Lieutenant Bailiff had rightly attached significance to the 
obligation of a trustee to act en bon père de famille which is a phrase derived 
from French law with no place in English law, even if it can be equated with 
the standard of care required of trustees in England, viz to act a prudent man 
of business.  The Guernsey Court of Appeal could find nothing to suggest that 
the 1989 Law was intended to take a different view with regard to exclusion 
clauses than the Court had taken with regard to customary law. The fact that 
the Law had not referred to gross negligence was only a mistake which was 
corrected by the 1990 Amendment. The change could not have been seen as 
significant because the report
11
 preceding the 1990 Law talked only of making 
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“minor technical amendments.” Thus the effect of the 1989 and 1990 Laws 
was to confirm the position that in Guernsey law, a trustee exoneration clause 
could not exclude liability for gross negligence. The question of 
retrospectivity did not therefore arise in respect of either Law, but if it had had 
to decide the matter, the Court would have held that neither Law had 
retrospective effect.  
 
PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
The trustee appealed to the Privy Council, the majority of whom (Lord 
Clarke, Lord Mance and Sir Robin Auld)
12
 held that clauses excluding 
liability for gross negligence were effective in Guernsey law until prohibited 
by the 1990 Law. The 1989 Law was clear: “a trust could not lawfully include 
a term excluding the trustee‟s liability for breach of his obligation to act en 
bon père de famille arising from his own fraud or wilful misconduct.”13 It was 
implicit in this express prohibition that the Law permitted a trustee to exclude 
liability for other causes, in particular negligence and gross negligence. The 
Court of Appeal had been wrong to hold that the omission of gross negligence 
in the original form of s 37(4) was a mistake. Firstly there was no evidence to 
support that conclusion. Secondly, the majority of the Board was of the view 
that the 1990 amendment was intended to follow the relevant change to the 
Jersey Law of 1984 because it employed almost identical terms.
14
 Moreover, 
since the Jersey Law in its original form contained no provision at all which 
expressly set out the extent to which a Jersey trust could exonerate a trustee, 
the inclusion of limits on exoneration clauses in the Guernsey Law of 1989 
must have been the result of a considered decision about what to allow and 
what to prohibit. The failure to prohibit exclusion of liability for gross 
negligence was not a mistake.  The beneficiaries therefore lost their arguments 
based on statutory interpretation.  
The question remained of what the position was in Guernsey customary 
law prior to the 1989 Law, and this is the question of most interest to English 
lawyers. The majority in the Privy Council held that the Court of Appeal was 
wrong in concluding that before 1989 the Guernsey courts would have 
followed Scottish Law in preference to English law.
15
  The Board accepted 
that there was a rule of Scottish law or policy to the effect that no trustee 
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could be exonerated in respect of fraud or gross negligence.
16
 It also entirely 
accepted that Guernsey looked to other jurisdictions for assistance in 
developing particular areas of law. In the case of trusts, however, the position 
in English law was the usual starting-point. While this would not be imported 
wholesale and would yield to Guernsey customary or statute law, there was no 
specific Guernsey customary law with regard to exclusion clauses and there 
was no evidence that Guernsey had at any stage looked at the law of Scotland.  
So, what would the Guernsey courts have discovered if they looked to 
English law? “It seems to the Board to be much more likely than not that a 
Guernsey lawyer or judge or the Board itself, considering the position under 
English law before 1989, would have looked at the cases cited by Millett LJ 
and would have reached the same conclusions as he did.”17 The Board did not 
think it important that Millett LJ differed on the interpretation of Scottish law. 
His view that negligence and gross negligence differed only in degree was not 
negated by examples in which English law recognised gross negligence 
because there was still a difference between both types of negligence and 
fraud.
 18
 Finally, even if for some purposes in systems drawing on Roman or 
classical principles gross negligence could be equated with fraud, that was not 
relevant to the interpretation of English law. There was no rational basis for 
drawing a distinction between liability for negligence and gross negligence,
19
 
and any such distinction would have had to be made by statute, as was done in 
Guernsey by the 1990 Law. The Board agreed with the Court of Appeal that 
the 1990 Law did not apply to breaches of trust before it came into force, and 
the same was true of the 2007 Law.  
Lord Mance, in a concurring opinion with which Sir Robin Auld agreed, 
raised the possibility that, for the purposes of applying exemption clauses, 
fraud might be interpreted as including cases where fraud was interpreted 
objectively, as it was in Walker v Stones.
20
 
 
DISSENTING OPINIONS 
 
Neither of the dissenting opinions agreed with the majority that the 
Guernsey courts, prior to 1989 would have reached the same conclusion about 
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exemption clauses as that reached subsequently in 1997 by Millett LJ in 
Armitage v Nurse. This is unsurprising given the contrary conclusion reached 
in the Guernsey courts in this case, and the various doubts which have been 
expressed about Armitage v Nurse.
21
 
Lady Hale pointed out that the Board had upheld a decision of the English 
Court of Appeal which had never been considered by the Supreme Court, and 
the Board should have been slow to depart from the views of the two lower 
courts of Guernsey, when to do so might pre-empt consideration of the issue 
in the English courts.
22
  Before Armitage v Nurse there had been considerable 
uncertainty about the law,
23
 and the view of the Law Commission that it was 
not possible to exclude liability for gross negligence was based upon thorough 
research.
24
 Predictions by the Law Commission could be wrong, and so it 
proved with Armitage v Nurse.
25
 But the decision had been subject to 
immediate criticism, and in 1999 the Trust Law Committee
26
 thought the 
force of the decision was diminished by the court‟s apparent view that it had 
to decide between outlawing or accepting all negligence clauses rather than 
considering whether to only outlaw exemption for gross negligence despite a 
long line of authority distinguishing the two.
27
 Lady Hale also noted the view 
of the Law Commission, in its examination in 2002 of the current law and 
practice of trustee exemption clauses in England and Wales: 
 
“It must be admitted that the authority of Armitage v Nurse ... is not 
entirely free from doubt. The view taken of the nineteenth century 
Scottish cases does not accord with the understanding of these 
decisions north of the border... While there is no reason why the 
English and Scottish law should be identical in this respect, the 
reliance placed by Millett LJ on the Scottish cases was clearly an 
important part of his reasoning, and should that reliance be shown to 
have been misplaced, the authority of the decision may thereby be 
called in question.”28 
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Lady Hale said that nothing could be concluded from the fact that the Law 
Commission in its later Report on Trustee Exemption Clauses
29
 did not 
recommend legislation. That did not mean that a higher court might not 
subsequently take a different view of the law. Since opinion about Armitage v 
Nurse was divided, it was open to the Guernsey courts to find that, given their 
jurisdictional heritage, and the differently expressed duty of trustees, liability 
for gross negligence could not be excluded. The Privy Council should not 
interfere with their decision to reach that conclusion. 
Lord Kerr agreed that English law before 1989 was uncertain, although 
there was an ample basis for advice that it was probably permissible to 
exempt a trustee from liability for gross negligence.
30
 However, he pointed 
out that no investigation of the public policy arguments was undertaken in 
Armitage v Nurse although Millett LJ had expressed concern about the 
propriety of professional trustees excluding liability for everything except 
actual fraud. The Scottish cases demonstrated that culpa lata (gross 
negligence) by a trustee could not be exempted in a trust deed, and there was a 
sufficient basis for the Guernsey Court of Appeal to conclude that this line of 
authority would have been applied than the less defensible English law. This 
was not, though, the principal basis for the Guernsey courts‟ decision, which 
was that the fundamental obligation of a trustee to act en bon père de famille 
gave rise to fiduciary obligations different from those in English law.
31
 He 
said: 
 
“Ultimately, it appears to me that the notion of exempting from 
liability a trustee 's gross negligence is not only inimical to the 
fiduciary duty that he owes to the beneficiary under Guernsey law, it 
is wholly destructive of the essential feature of the relationship 
between the two.”32  
 
The Scottish cases the Guernsey court followed were based on similar 
reasoning. 
  
COMMENTARY 
 
Trusts are a creation of English law, and it is natural to assume that in 
cases of uncertainty in other jurisdictions, English law can provide a useful, 
even if not conclusive, guide. There is also value in achieving some harmony 
between different jurisdictions in areas like trusts and finance where 
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international transactions are commonplace.
33
 However, the value of English 
law as a guide to the resolution of uncertainty is surely diminished where 
English law itself is uncertain and controversial, as it is in relation to trustee 
exclusion clauses, and certainly was prior to the decision in Armitage v Nurse. 
That was recognised in the minority opinions, but appears to have had little 
effect upon the majority. Reconstructing the past is never easy, and it is even 
harder to decide how a question which was never asked in the past might have 
been answered then. It is, of course, not open to a judge to leave the question 
unanswered when it is essential to the outcome of the litigation. The detailed 
consideration by the majority of the conclusion in Armitage v Nurse, and its 
endorsement of it, may be seen as an indication of how the decision will be 
treated if the question of trustee exclusion clauses reaches the Supreme Court. 
However, the dissenting opinions leave continued uncertainty, and the respect 
traditionally shown for decisions of the Privy Council by no means guarantees 
that the same view will necessarily be taken in domestic English courts.
34
 
Moreover, despite the endorsement of Armitage v Nurse, some ammunition is 
given to its critics. For instance, Millett LJ was convinced that the Scottish 
cases could be treated as based upon the interpretation of the exclusion 
clauses used in the cases concerned. All but one of the judges in the Privy 
Council in this case take a different view and accept that the Scottish cases 
establish a rule of law that trustees cannot be exempted from liability for gross 
negligence. 
There can be sound reasons of policy why the law varies from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction. The decision of the majority of the Privy Council aligns 
Guernsey law with English law only in respect of acts or omissions by 
trustees prior to the coming into force of the Trusts (Amendment) (Guernsey) 
Law 1990. Since that date, the law in the two jurisdictions is different, for one 
or both of two reasons. The first is that there may be a more significant 
difference between the concepts of en bon père de famille used in Guernsey 
and that of the prudent man of business as tests for the standard of a trustee‟s 
conduct than the Privy Council appears to have believed.
35
 A man of business 
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is more likely to be prepared to take risks than a bon père de famille (which is 
why the duty of care defined by reference to the prudent man of business has 
to be qualified by adding that he acts “for the benefit of other people for 
whom he felt morally bound to provide”).36 Moreover, the concept of the bon 
père de famille is an obvious import from Norman or French law, and in 
French law is one where a departure from the required standard of conduct 
can be either simple or lourde (ordinary or gross).  There is therefore a more 
rational basis for distinguishing between ordinary and gross negligence than 
the Privy Council acknowledges. The second reason for the distinction is that 
the offshore trust business is of great importance to Guernsey‟s status as an 
international financial centre, and that status is likely to be enhanced by rules 
on exclusion clauses which are more favourable to beneficiaries. As Sir de 
Vic Carey said at first instance, “settlors and beneficiaries of trusts... needed 
to have the reassurance that Guernsey was a suitable place to bring their 
wealth for looking after.”37 
Just as other jurisdictions can learn from decisions of the English courts, 
so our courts can learn from decisions in other jurisdictions. The dismissal by 
most of the judges in the Privy Council of the concept of the bon père de 
famille as an explanation for a different attitude to exclusion clauses in 
Guernsey before the 1990 Law is based on treating the concept as no more 
than a different way of explaining the idea of the prudent man of business. 
This seems to underplay the significance of a concept which may, in fact, be a 
better way of explaining the range of obligations which fall upon a person 
with fiduciary responsibilities to place the interests of others above his own 
interests than the obligations commonly shown in the frequently cut-throat 
world of business. There could also be value in addressing the utility of the 
concept of gross negligence in relation to exclusion clauses. It is surely 
legitimate to ask whether there is a difference in terms of culpability and 
responsibility between say, a total failure by a newly appointed professional 
trustee to review the actions of the previous trustees, and a review which, 
through careless oversight, fails to identify one isolated instance of a breach. 
Under the principles adopted in Armitage v Nurse the trustees would not only 
escape liability in both instances, despite the seriousness of the breach, they 
would be entitled to claim their fees as if they had acted with due diligence. 
Millett LJ himself seemed to recognise this, pointing out that the exemption 
clause in that case: 
 
“…exempts the trustee from liability for loss or damage to the trust 
property no matter how indolent, imprudent, lacking in diligence, 
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negligent or wilful he may have been, so long as he has not acted 
dishonestly.”38 
 
In response to the claim that exclusion clauses allow a professional fee 
charger to act irresponsibly, it is often countered that exclusion clauses are 
risk-shifting devices which simply transfer the onus of taking out insurance 
against the risk. However, that argument may have little merit in the case of 
trustee exemption clauses. Lord Clarke points out in this case that professional 
trustees may be unwilling to take on the administration of trusts without the 
protection of exclusion clauses of very wide effect given the cost and 
difficulty of obtaining insurance
39
 (the argument used to persuade the Law 
Commission not to recommend legislative change to the result produced by 
Armitage v Nurse). But, by thereby transferring the risk to the beneficiaries, 
the risk is upon parties who have very little ability to control it, and whose 
ability to obtain insurance (or to spread the risk if insurance is not available) is 
even more constrained than professional trustees. Fairness is therefore a 
relevant consideration in deciding where the line should be drawn in relation 
to trustee exemption clauses. Guernsey and Jersey have chosen to draw that 
line between ordinary negligence and gross negligence. There appears to be 
no evidence that doing this by legislation in 1990 and 1989 respectively has 
destroyed or even damaged their professional trust business, and as Lord Kerr 
observed in his closing observations: 
 
“The fact that this [dissenting conclusion] would have resulted in 
discordance between the law in England and Wales and that in 
Guernsey could have been faced with equanimity, I believe. If …. the 
placing of reliance on a responsible person to manage property so as 
to promote the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust is central to the 
concept of trusteeship, denying trustees the opportunity to avoid 
liability for their gross negligence seems to be entirely in keeping with 
that essential aim.” 40 
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